United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit



APPENDIX

76-1431

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

-against
WILLIAM ALGARIN

Defendant-Appellant:

APPENDIX FOR APPELLANT WILLIAM ALGARIN



ABRAHAM SOLOMON Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 85 Baxter Street New York, New York 10013 PAGINATION AS IN ORIGINAL COPY

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MDJ-080B

21 USC 812,841(a)(1),841(b)(1)(A) and 346 - MARCOTICS

James A. Moss 791-1920

C. Car.

Joseph Hallinan 20 E. 46th St., N.Y.C.

enament to produce the same of partie of the 01-MARTINEZ, 02-VAZQUEZ, 04-RODRIQUES EAUL JOAN E SEAT - JA:5---Complaint filed, C. Joseph Hallinan, Esq., 20 E. 45th St., N.Y. 4/29/76 assigned. Defendant released on \$5,000 PRB without security, co-signed by mother, defendant's address: 60 Columbia St., N.Y., co-signer, same address. Indictment filed, 76 Cr. 445 5/4/76 Deft. (17 yrs) (Atty. present) thru interpreter Sylvia Angular enters a 5-13-76 not guilty plea. Bail continued as fixed \$5,000. P.R.B. Case assigned to Judge Pollack. Wyatt, Filed documents forwarded by Magistrate Jacobs: 05-17-76 4-29-75 complaint filed. The trial before Pollack ! 1/19/74 Jury trial begun before Judge Pollack. 07-20-76

07-21-76

Ct. 1 dismissed. Trial conc'd. Trial cont'd and concluded. Deft. found guilty as 07-22-75

charged on ct. 5. Deft. remanded in liou of increased bail of \$5,000. cash. Pro-sencence report ordered. For sectance 9-20-76 at 22M room 506. Pollack, J.

Filed GJA-21 appointment of Incorpreter The Trabout, 67-95 Clyde St., Forest Hills, Fig. 113/5 LACK J. LACK J. LACK J. Street GJA-21 Approval for payment of fees for Interpreter The Trabout. Issued all copies. POLIACK J. POLIACK J. POLIACK J. Clydenapolytic record of providings, Cated Stag 10,20,23,476.

Filed Judgment (atty Abraham Solomon & Norme Selzer, interpreter.) The deft. is hereby committed to the custody of the Atty. General or his authorized mapresentative as a YOUTH OFFINDER on count 5 purchast to Section 5010(a) of Title 10, U.S.Code. Imaginism of contance is suspended. Deft. in placed on Probation for a period of THREE (3) YEARS, subject to the standing probation order of this court... POLLACK. J

Filed deft's notice of appeal from judgment of 9-20-76, mailed copies
Leave to appeal in forma pauperis is granted.

Pollack, J.

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT COUPE

-76 DIL 1445

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TIDICH ENT

CUPADDO LEIDENA MARTITLE, a/k/a 'Junior', PEDRO VAZOULZ, UTLLINI ALGARIN, and JOSE COLON RODRIGUEZ,

Defendants.

COUNT ONE

The Grand Jury charges:

1. From on or about the 1st day of January, 1976, and continuously thereafter up to and including the date of the filing of this indictment, in the Southern District of New York, GERARDO MEDINA MARTINEZ, a/k/a "Junior", PEDRO VAZQUEZ, WILLIAM ALCARIN, and JOSE COLON RODRIGUEZ, the defendants, and others to the Grand Jury unknown, unlawfully, intentionally and knowingly combined, conspired, confederated and agreed together and with each other to violate Sections 512, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A) of Title 21, United States Code.

2. It was part of said conspiracy that the said defendants unlawfully, intentionally and knowingly would distribute and possess with intent to distribute Schedule I narcotic drug controlled substances, the exact amount thereof being to the Grand Jury unknown, in violation of Sections 112, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A) of Title 21, United States Code.

2. It was part of said conspiracy that the said defendants unlawfully, intentionally and knowingly would distribute and possess with intent to distribute Schedule I narcotic drug controlled substances, the exact amount thereof being to the Grand Jury unknown, in violation of Sections C12, 341(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A) of Title 21, United States Code.

OVERT ACTS

In pursuance of the said conspiracy and to effect the objects thereof, the following overt acts were committed in the Southern District of New York:

1. On or about February 20, 1976, the defendant GUTARDO MEDINA MARTINEZ, while in an apartment at 347 East 10th Street, New York, New York, sold to an undercover

officer of the Drug Enforcement Administration Task Force approximately one ounce of heroin for \$1800.

- 2. On or about February 26, 1976, the defendant GERARDO MEDINA MARTINEZ, while in Apartment 20 at 347 Test 10th Street, New York, New York, sold approximately two ounces of heroin for \$3200.
- 3. On or about March 12, 1976, the defendant GERARDO MEDINA MARTINEZ stated that his brother would be arriving from Chicago the following week with three hundred ounces of heroin.
- 4. On or about March 12, 1976 the defendant GERARDO MEDIKA MARTINEZ, while in Apartment 13D at 60 Columbia Stree, New York, New York, sold approximately one and one-half ounces of heroin for \$2400.
- 5. On or about April 22, 1976, the defendants GERARDO MEDIKA MARTINEZ, WILLIAM ALGARIN and PEDEO VAZCUEZ, while in the vicinity of East 11th Street and Avenue D, New York, New York, had a meeting to discuss the colivery of some heroin.
- 6. On or about April 28, 1976, at which time defendant WILLIAM ALGARIN was present, the defendant PEDRO VAZOUEZ told the defendant GERARDO MEDINA MARTINEZ to count money to be received as payment for a sale of heroin.
- 7. On or about April 28, 1976 the defendants GERARDO MEDINA MARTINEZ and WILLIAM ALGARIN met with JOSE COLON RODRIGUEZ.

7. On or about April 28, 1976 the defendants
GERARDO MEDIKA MARTINEZ and WILLIAM ALGARIN Det with JOSE
COLON RODRIGUEZ.

8. On or about April 28, 1976, while in the precises at 11th Street and Avenue B, New York, New York, the defendant JOSE COLON RODRIGUEZ stated that no one should leave those precises until ropey was delivered in payment for a quantity of heroin.

(Title 21, United States Code, Section (40.)

COURT THO

The Grand Jury further charges:

On or about the 20th day of February, 1978 in the Southern District of New York, GENARDO MIPHEA MARTINEZ, a/k/a "Junior", the defendant, unlawfully, intentionally and knowingly did distribute and possess with intent to distribute a Schedule I narcotic drug controlled substance, to wit, approximately one ounce of heroin.

(Title 21, United States Code, Sections 812, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A).)

COUNT TERME

The Grand Jury further charges:

On or about the 26th day of February, 1976, in the Southern District of New York, CEPAPDO MEDINA MARYTHEZ, a/k/a "Junior", the defendant, unlawfully, intentionally and knowingly did distribute and possess with intent to distribute a Schedule I narcotic drug controlled substance, to wit, approximately two ounces of heroin.

(Title 21, United States Code, Sections 812, 641(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A).)

COUNT FOUR

The Grand Jury further charges:

On or about the 12th day of Earch, 1976, in the Southern District of New York, GEVARDO EXDINA MARTINEZ, A/k/o "Junior", the defendant, unlawfully, intentionally and knowingly did distribute and possess with intent to distribute a Schedule I narcotic drug controlled substance, to wit, approximately one and one-half ounces of heroin.

(Title 21, United States Cose, Sections 812, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A).)

COURT FOUR

The Grand Jury further charges:

On or about the 12th day of Earch, 1976, in the Southern District of New York, GEFARDO MEDIEA MARTINET, 1/1/a "Junior", the defendant, unlawfully, intentionally and knowingly did distribute and possess with intent to distribute a Schedule I narcotic drug controlled substance, to wit, approximately one and one-half ounces of heroin.

(Title 21, United States Cose, Sections 112, 141(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A).)

COLUM TIME

the Grand Jury turther charges:

On or about the 2sth day of Arril, 1976, in the Southern District of tew York, CHARLO HEDINA HARRING.

L' The Junior, FEDRO WASCURY, VILLERY ALCAPT, on Junior G. ON 19080 CURZ, the defencence, unlargely, intersion 137

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> and knowingly did distribute and possess with intent to distribute a Schedule I narcotic drug controlled substance, to wit, approximately four and one-half ounces of heroin.

(Title 21, United States Code, Sections 812, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A), and Title 18, United States Code, Section 2.)

FOREMAN

ROBERT B. FISKE, JR. United States Attorney 1000 No. USA-333-274 (36. 9-23-45)

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United States District Court

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

3.6

GERARDO MEDINA MARTINEZ, a/k/a "Junior", PEDRO VAZQUEZ, VILLIAM ALGANIN, and JOSE COLON RODRIGUEZ,

Defendants.

INDICTMENT

76 Cr

(21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 812, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A); 18 U.S.C. §2.)

ROBERT B. FISKE, JR.

United States Attorney.

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TRUE BILL

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JUL 2 0 1976 CERLOSO MEDETA MARTIMEZ (d.o.b. 7/10/52) (atty Stanley). Tellogram present) Pleads guilty thru interpreter Crivia Aguilar. Tre-sectors a gort ordered. Par Cantagne Annest 25, 1976 at 20 197., Fm. 15 6. Deft, Remarded in 11au (J. Jenoit. uptr.) P. CALLES; W. ALCARIN and J.J. MCRITUSE (attra Legencer Tebecots, alcama adjument and alcamater spiriter are sent) (the respect and Sylvia Appliar; interpreters, area JUL 0 0 1976 in Cort) house: Modack, J. Jury Print Face. (11:10 A.C. TREAL COUTD. TOYURNMENT PRINTE RULE DEFENDANTS Rule, Count come is Dismissed as to all there differ, all The motions are denied. DIL 22 1976 Frial Contd and Concluded, - JURY VERD. CT (3:30 P.H.) -DEFT. REDRO VALCUEZ Found Not guilty.Bail exomerated. Deft. discharged. ---DEFT. VILLU ALUMEN found GUILTY as charged on ct. 5.
DEFT. JOSE GOLON RODRIGUEZ found GUILTY as charged on ct. 5. ---Jury Polled. Jury excused. --DEFT. WILLIAM ALGARIN Remanded in lieu of increased bail of \$5,000. cash. ---DEFT. JOSE OCLON RODRIGUEZ continued on present bail and given until July 27, 1976 at 3 P.M., to post an additional \$1,000. cash bail. DEFTS. ALGARIN & RODRIGUEZ -Pre-sentence report ordered. For sentence Sept. 20, 1976 POLLACK, J. (J.Benoit, Rotr.) GERARDO MEDINA MARTINEZ, a/k/a "Junior" (d.o.b. 7/12/52)(atty Stanley V. Tolleran present) SEMERICED. FIVE YEARS on each of cts. 1,2,3,4 and 5 to run concurrently with placed on Special Parole for a period of THRUE YEARS to commence upon expiration of the provision of T. 21, U.S.C., Cection 3/2, the deft. is the firement. Deft. Remanded. PCLLACK.J. (X. Hamfeld Porte) SEP 2 0 1376 UILLIO ALGARTO (Atty Abraham Solomogia sent) as a MOUTH 1.0.0. 71759 (Antempreter Jorda Seiler present)
PRESEDER on count.5 pursuant to Sestion 5010(a) of Fitle 19, U.S.Code. Emposition of sentence is suspended. Defendant is placed on propation for a period of THREE(3) YEARS, subject to the standing probation order of this Court. Deft. advised of his right to appeal. Defendant is discharged from custody. POLLACK JOSE COLON ROCRIGUEZ(a bty Loster Yudenfriendspresent) -SENTENCED on count 5 for a term of ONE YEAR, and on condition that deft. be confined in a JANE TYPE institution for a period of THREE YEARS, the execution of the remainder of the sensence of imprisonment is hereby suspended of the remainuer of the sentence of imprisonment is hereby suspended and the defendant is placed on probation for a period of THREE(3)YEARS, subject to the standing probation order of this Jourt. T.18, U.S.C., Section 3651. --Pursuant to the provisions of T. 21, U.S.C., Section But the deft. is placed on Special Parole for a period of THREE YEARS to commence upon expiration of confinement. The Special Parole is to run Appeal. -Deft. is continued on present bail pending appeal on consition that he occumptly file his lapeal. that he promptly file his appeal.

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2	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
3	vs. 76 Cr. 445
4	GERARDO MEDINA MARTINEZ, et al.
5	
6	July 22, 1976
7	10:00 a.m.
8	(Trial resumed, jury present.)
9	THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.
10	THE CLERK: The Court is about to charge the
11	jury. Any spectators wishing to leave the courtroom will do
12	so now or remain seated until the completion of the Court's
13	charge.
14	Mr. Marshall, please lock the door.
15	CHARGE OF THE COURT
16	THE COURT: Members of the jury, we have reached
17	the concluding phase of this trial. I shall now give you
18	your final instructions on the law and these will guide your
19	deliberations.
20	I want to express to you the Court's
21	appreciation for your attentiveness and patience during
22	this trial as befits the triers of fact in a case of
23	importance to the parties.

but only three are before you in this particular trial for

25

The indictment in this case names four defendants

reasons with which you have no concern.

Those named and who are on trial are Pedro

Vazquez, William Algarin and Jose Colon Rodriguez and it is
as to these three that you are called upon to find them to
be guilty or not guilty in your verdict, although, as I will
explain to you shortly, in considering whether any of them
are guilty or not guilty, you may have to determine the
nature of the participation, if any, in the case of the
fourth who is not on trial here, Gerardo Medina Martinez, the
fourth person named in the indictment.

You are called upon to consider only one count against the defendants on trial. That count charges that on April 28, 1976, the four persons distributed and possessed with intent to distribute four ounces of heroin.

In the determination of innocence or guilt, you must bear in mind that guilt is personal. The guilt or innocence of a defendant on trial before you must be determined separately with respect to him, separately with respect to each and solely on the evidence presented or the lack of evidence.

It is your recollection of the facts that counts here and not the recollection of counsel and not my recollection. It is for you to determine the weight that will be given to the evidence, the credibility that you will

extend to the witnesses who testify and the reasonable inferences that are to be drawn from the evidence that has been received.

As I stated, the count charges that on April 28, 1976, the defendants Martinez, Vazquez, Algarin and Rodriguez unlawfully, willfully, intentionally and knowingly distributed and possessed with intent to distribute four ounces of heroin.

You must approach your duty with an attitude of complete fairness and impartiality without the slightest trace of sympathy, prejudice or bias, either for or against the Government or any of the defendants.

It is my province to instruct you as to the legal principles that are to be followed in the case and it is your duty to accept those instructions as they are given to you by me. On the other hand, it is your exclusive function to determine the facts on the basis of your consideration of the evidence and then applying the instructions as to the law that I am about to give you, to decide whether or not the defendant on trial before you is guilty of the charges made against that defendant.

You are the sole and exclusive judges of the facts. Your decision as to the fact is final and conclusive.

It is essential in the performance of your duty that

anything ordered stricken from the record you put out of your mind and disregard it. Similarly, if a question was asked and an objection to that question was sustained and no answer was given, the question itself should play no part in your consideration of the case.

No inferences as to guilt or innocence of any defendant on trial or as to the credibility of any witness should be drawn from any rulings that I have made or from the fact that on occasion I may have asked questions of certain witnesses. Any questions that were asked were intended only for clarification or to expedite matters. They were not intended to suggest any opinions on my part as to the guilt or innocence of any defendant or as to the credibility of anyone who appeared before you.

It is neither my intention nor my function to favor one side or the other or to imply that I have any views as to the credibility of any of the witnesses or as to the guilt or innocence of any of the defendants. That is your sole function and it is exclusive to you.

In evaluating the evidence which has been placed before you, you will determine the reliability of the witnesses you have heard and the extent to which you can count on any or all of them for accurate accounts of the facts.

You have had an opportunity to observe those witnesses as they testified. You will be asking yourselves and thinking together how each witness impressed you:

Did the witness appear to be truthful, candid, frank and forthright or did the witness seem evasive or shifty or suspect in any other way. Did the witness appear to know what he was talking about, and did he impress you as having a purpose to report his knowledge to you carefully, conservatively, truthfully and accurately? Was he consistent or self-contradictory? How did the manner and matter of his direct testimony compare with his manner and matter of testimony tested on cross-examination?

events have been called for that a witness refers to reports contemporaneously prepared to refresh recollection. That is not unusual. And the law allows one to be refreshed in his recollection.

However, you will judge the need, therefore, in the light of your own experience and understanding of human behavior and memory. You should consider not only the intrinsic persuasiveness of each person's testimony by itself but its setting in the circumstances of the whole case -- for example, the degree to which any particular item of testimony is corroborated or contradicted by other

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evidence in the case and all such things. You will test
these by your own mature judgment about life and about people
and about human behavior.

A witness may be discredited or, as we say, impeached by contradictory evidence or by evidence that at other times he made statements inconcistent with his testimony here on the witness stand.

You should consider, among other things, the question of interest or motives. The witnesses have identified their backgrounds and associations. If you believe that a witness has willfully sworn falsely before you, you are free to disregard all of his testimony or to accept and credit those parts of it as your judgment dictates should be accepted.

Two of the defendants took the witness stand as witnesses on this trial. Having chosen voluntarily to testify, you are to judge their credibility by the same standards and tests by which you judge every other witness' credibility.

Interest creates a motive for false testimony.

The defendant, of course, has a deep personal interest in the outcome and this interest may be considered along with all the other evidence in weighing his testimony and determining how far and to what extent it is worthy of

belief. It by no means follows that simply because a defendant has a vital interest in the end result he is not capable of telling the truth, but it is for you to decide to what extent, if at all, his interest has affected or shaded his testimony.

There are, generally speaking, two types of evidence from which a jury may properly find the truth in the facts of the case. One is direct evidence, such as the testimony of an eyewitness or a participant. The other is indirect or circumstantial evidence, the proof of a chain of circumstances pointing to the existence or non-existence of certain facts.

In order to prove a fact by circumstantial evidence, there must be positive proof of some fact which though true does not itself directly establish the fact in dispute but does afford a reasonable basis for a reasonable inference of its existence. The fact or facts upon which it is sought to base an inference must be shown and not left to conjecture and when shown, it must appear that the inference drawn is the only one that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from the facts and that any other explanation is fairly and reasonably excluded.

Now, let me give you a common example of circumstantial evidence and what I have been trying to say

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to you to illustrate the point:

Suppose at the time you came into court this morning, the sun was shining and there were no clouds in the sky and when you came into this trial courtroom the blinds were drawn and the shades were down so that you could not see outside. Pretty soon, someone came through that door, walking into the courtroom with a dripping umbrella and a dripping raincoat. You have not been outside in the meantime and when you left outside, it was clear but when this person came in with his dripping umbrella and raincoat, you might infer that something may have happened outside. You would be entitled to infer from the circumstances that there is a dripping umbrella and a raincoat that it is raining outside. Thus, circumstantially, you infer from a fact—the fact being the dripping raincoat and umbrella, some other matter — the rain outside.

The mind is led circumstantially from a fact to reach another fact. That illustrates what circumstantial evidence is and what it may lead to.

It is not necessary that the participation or lack of participation of a defendant in any crime charged be shown by direct evidence. The connection may be inferred from such fact and circumstances as legitimately tend to sustain that inference.

In this case, of course, each side has produced either on direct or cross-examination both direct and indirect or circumstantial evidence. The direct evidence consists of the heroin having been presented to you. You have oral testimony subject to tests of recollection, demeanor and credibility. The Government contends that its direct evidence and circumstantal evidence establishes each defendant's guilt. Each defendant contends that no evidence has overcome the presumption of his innocence and that at least there is a reasonable doubt of his guilt.

You will apply to all the evidence the same standard of proof. It must satisfy you of the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt are else you must acquit that defendant.

The indictment, as I explained to you previously, is merely an accusation, a charge, a charge which brings the defendant to the courtroom. It is not evidence or proof of a defendant's guilt.

One of its purposes is to define the scope of the proof at the trial. The Government has the burden of proving the charges against the defendants beyond a reasonable doubt. That is a burden that never shifts and remains upon the Government throughout the trial.

A defendant under our law does not have to prove

his innocence. On the contrary, he is presumed to be innocent of the accusation contained in the indictment. A defendant does not have to take the witness stand to testify for himself. A defendant's failure to testify cannot be considered by you as evidence against him or form the basis for any presumption or inference unfavorable to him.

The presumption of innocence was in the favor of each of these defendants at the start of the trial, continues in their favor throughout the trial, is in their favor even as I instruct you now. It is removed only if and when you have been satisfied that the Government has sustained its burden of proving the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.

By reasonable doubt we do not mean mathematical certainty or proof beyond all possible doubt. We do mean a doubt which is sufficient to cause a prudent person to hesitate to act in a matter of importance to himself or herself. If the evidence which you believe is such as would induce a prudent person to act without hesitation in a matter of importance to himself or herself, then you may say you have been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt.

A reasonable doubt is not a speculative doubt.

It is not caprice or whim. It is not a guess. It is not a

means by which to disregard or fail to perform an unpleasant duty. It must be, as the words used say, a reasonable doubt.

If, on the other hand, your mind is waivering or uncertain to the point where you have a doubt that would cause a prudent person to hesitate in a matter of importance to him or her, then you have not been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt.

As I indicated, "beyond a reasonable doubt" does not mean to a positive certainty or beyond all possible doubt. If the rule required positive certainty or beyond all possible doubt, few persons, however guilty they might be, would ever be convicted. Unless you are involved in a matter capable of mathematical certainty, it is practically impossible for a person to be absolutely and completely convinced of a controverted fact. Consequently, the law does not require mathematical certainty.

The law in a criminal case is that it is sufficient if the guilt of a defendant is established beyond a reasonable doubt, not beyond all possible doubt.

The indictment charges each of these defendants on trial before you with violations of the Federal Narcotics

Laws on April 28, 1976. The Comprehensive Drug Abuse

Prevention Act of 1970 was passed by Congress because of

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concern with the illegal importation and distribution or possession of narcotic drugs with a view to distribution which have a substantial and detrimental effect on the health and welfare of our people.

The part of this act which is applicable to the charges here is called the Controlled Substances Act which became effective on May 1, 1971. It is only necessary for you to remember the conduct which the act forbids and the essential elements of the offenses here charged.

The term "controlled substances" is used in the act to refer to any drugs included in one of five schedules contained in the Controlled Substances A t. Heroin is included in Schedule 1. Among other things, it is made unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to distribute or possess with intent to distribute any controlled substances, such as heroin. In addition, any person who conspires to commit such offense commits a crime.

Another section of the law, Section 2 of
Title 18 of the United States Code, provides in pertinent
part, "Whoever commits an offense against the United States
or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its
commission, is punishable just as a principal, just as if
he were the principal."

Let me turn to the specific charge against the

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defendants:

Title 21 of the United States Code, Section 841, privides in pertinent part, "It shall be unlawfull for any person knowingly or intentionally to distribute or possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance."

The indictment charges all three defendants on trial and Gerardo Martinez with the distribution or possession with the intent to distribute the amount of heroin that I mentioned. Before you can find any one of these defendants guilty of the crime charged in this count of the indictment, you must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the Government has proved each of the following elements:

First, that on or about April 28, 1976, the defendant you are considering did distribute or possess with intent to distribute a narcotic drug controlled substance.

Second, that he did so unlawfully, willfully and knowingly.

Third, that the substance charged to have been distributed in the count is in fact a narcotic drug controlled substance -- in this case, heroin.

I would like to say a few words on each of t.ese elements.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT COURT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE

You will note that the first element of the

offense is to distribute or possess with intent to distribute the drug. What does that phrase mean?

I want to stress that it is sufficient if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant you are considering either distributed or possessed with intent to distribute the narcotic drug.

The word "distribute" means the actual,

constructive or attempted transfer of the drug. The word

"possess" has its common everyday meaning -- that is, to

have something within your control, not necessarily in your

pocket or in your hand.

Possession may be of two types -- actual or constructive. Actual possession means that a particular person, a defendant, knowingly has personal, manual or physical control of the drug, but constructive possession means that although the drugs are in the physical possession of another person, a defendant knowingly has the power to exercise control over them or over their distribution or to direct their movement or to cause their delivery or aids and abets knowingly and intentionally in respect pereof.

In other words, to possess something, you need not have it in your hand or in your pocket, as I have said; if it is within your power to exercise control over the

drugs, you have possession of them.

Finally, the word "intent" refers to a person's state of mind, so the term "possess with intent to distribute" can be fairly stated to mean to control an item with a state of mind or purpose to transfer or deliver that item.

As to the second element, the term "unlawfully, willfully and knowingly" means that you are to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant whom you are considering knew what he was doing and that he acted deliberately and voluntarily as opposed to mistakenly or accidently or as a result of some coercion. It is not necessary he knew that he was violating any particular law. It is sufficient if you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he was aware of the general unlawful nature of his conduct.

Knowledge and intent exist in the mind. Since it is not possible to look into a man's mind to see what went on, the only way you have for arriving at a decision on these questions is for you to take into consideration all the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence, including the exhibits, and to determine from all such facts and circumstances whether the requisite knowledge and intent was present at the time in question.

 Direct proof is unnecessary. In this connection, the Government contends that the defendants attempted to conceal their narcotics activities on April 28, 1976 by hiding their narcotics activities, by concealing the narcotics themselves and by guarding and camouflaging their conversations and by being secretive in their actions.

If you find circumstances of intrigue or deviousness or attempts by a defendant to conceal or be secret about the true nature of the transaction, this may be considered as circumstantial evidence of knowledge of unlawful purpose.

As to the third essential element, the indictment charges that the narcotic drug controlled substance is heroin. I instruct you as a matter of law that heroin is a narcotic controlled substance. You, however, must still find beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance is heroin. You may consider the stipulation as to the testimony of the Government chemist in this regard who, it was stipulated, if called, would testify that heroin was part of this April 28, 1976 happening.

Finally, it is not necessary for the Government to show as to the charge you are considering that a defendant physically committed the crime himself. The law provides that a person who aids and abets another to commit an offense

is just as guilty of that offense as if he committed it himself.

In the context of this case, accordingly, you may find a defendant guilty of the offense charged in the count you are considering if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that Gerardo Martinez or another defendant committed the offense with which he is charged within the count and that the defendant whom you are considering aided and abetted the one who committed the offense.

To determine whether a defendant aided and abetted the commission of the offense charged, you ask yourselves these questions:

Did he knowingly and intentionally participate in it as something he wished to bring about?

Did he associate himself with the venture?

Did he seek by his action to make it successful?

If he did, then you may find that he is an aider and abettor and, therefore, guilty in that way.

The duty of imposing sentence rests exclusively upon a judge. Your function is to weigh the evidence in the case and to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant you are considering solely upon the basis of the evidence and the law.

Under your oath as jurors, you cannot allow a

consideration of the punishment which might be inflicted upon a defendant if convicted to influence you in your verdict in any way or in any sense enter into your deliberations.

You are to decide upon the evidence and the evidence alone and you must not be influenced by any assumptions, conjectures or inferences not warranted by the facts until proven to your satisfection.

You must consider the guilt or innocence of each defendant individually. Further, as you probably already know, a verdict of guilty or not guilty on the count on which you are reporting must be unanimous to be acceptable.

The issues for you to decide relate to an offense under the narcotics laws. We are not engaged in a popularity contest. When you enter the jury box, you are not expected to check your common sense outside. You should use your common sense and general experience in evaluating all the testimony and circumstances in evidence and not be confined or confused or diverted from the task that you are here to perform. The task is to find the facts.

Please do not communicate with anyone concerning your deliberations in this case except in writing signed by your spokesman, who will be Mrs. Lovaro, the lady who sits

1	jbesb-19
2	in the first seat. She will be provided with pencil and
3	paper.
4	I would now like to take a moment to talk to
5	the lawyers at the side bar. They may wish to call to my
6	attention any matter that I may have overlooked or where I
7	may have misspoken, and I will ask you to relax for a
8	moment while I do that.
9	(At the side bar)
10	MR. SOLOMON: I don't know whether you put
11	mere association because at certain points you dropped your
12	voice. If you didn't, I ask you to cover mere association.
13	I put that in the conspiracy request but now
14	that the conspiracy is out, the request is withdrawn.
15	Outside of that, I have no objection.
16	MR. TABACOFF: No exceptions.
17	MR. SPITZER: No exceptions.
18	THE COURT: Any exceptions or objections to the
19	charge on the part of the Government?
20	MR. SIFFERT: Yesterday you said you would charg
21	on joint venture.
22	THE COURT: I think I have sufficiently charged
23	on the subject as indicated.
24	(In the presence of the jury.)

THE COURT: I should like to add that mere

association, without more, of any defendant with any other defendant is not sufficient by itself to establish membership in a joint enterprise. The Government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant whom you are considering entered into the transaction in some measure and in some part with a specific criminal intent —that is, with a purpose to violate the law.

So, if a defendant with understanding of the unlawful character of the alleged transaction intentionally engages, advises or assists or aids and abets for the purpose of furthering the illegal undertaking, he thereby becomes a participant in the transaction.

Does that cover it, Mr. Solomon?

MR. SOLOMON: Yes, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: I believe that that also covers the Government's suggestion.

MR. SIFFERT: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, you may now go out for your deliberations but first, Miss Mendel and Miss Jenkins, we have now reached the conclusion of the trial and as alternates, you are excused with the thanks of the Court.

(One marshal duly sworn.)

THE COURT: All right, now you may leave.

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(At 10:37 a.m., the jury left the courtroom to commence deliberations.)

THE COURT: Court's Exhibit 2 will be a schedule of the 3500 material furnished by the Government to the defendants, and it consists of two pages.

(3500 material marked Court's Exhibit 2.)

(Recess)

(11:20 a.m., in the courtroom, jury not present.)

THE COURT: I have a note from the jury which says, "Transcript, the statement made by Martinez to Algarin, 'Cover me,' according to Detective Balmer."

I suppose by that, they want the testimony in the transcript, and will you see if you can find that, Mr. Reporter.

(Pause)

(At 11:23 a.m., the jury entered the courtroom.)

THE COURT: The jury has requested the transcript of the statement made by Martinez, "Cover me," according to Detective Balmer.

I should say to the jury that we don't have a transcript but we have a reporter who has notes and he will read it to you.

xxx

1	jbesb-22
2	(Record read)
3	THE COURT: Is that the part that the jury
4	referred to?
5	THE FORELADY: Yes, it is.
6	THE COURT: All right. You may leave.
7	(At 11:29, the jury left the courtroom
8	to continue deliberations.)
9	THE COURT: Apparently there was a second
10	note in here which says, "Transcript of Detective Angel
11	Rodriguez's conversation in car."
12	Mr. Clerk, take this back to the marshal and
13	ask the j ry if this is something they also intended to
14	send in.
15	Well, I guess
16	MR. SOLOMON: Your Honor, there was a
17	conversation in the car. What they probably mean is what
18	did Detective Rodriguez testify he heard my client say in
19	the car.
20	MR. SIFFERT: There was more than that. There
21	was Mr. Martinez saying, "I told you the black guy was a
22	shrimp."
23	(At 11:38 a.m., the jury returned to the
24	courtroom.)
25	THE COURT: Sorry to have to recall you but I

1	jbesb-23					
2	didn't realize that there was a second note in the same					
3	envelope. We didn't find it until after you had gone out.					
4	The second note calls for Detective Angel					
5	Rodriguez's conversation in the car and by that, I assume					
6	you refer to the rebuttal testimony witness. The reporter					
7	will read it, if that is what you want.					
8	You let me know. If there is anything further,					
9	you let me know.					
10	(Record read)					
11	THE COURT: Is there anything else before you g					
12	out that you are calling for, any other part of the					
13	testimony?					
14	THE FORELADY: No, sir.					
15	THE COURT: If not, you may go out.					
16	(At 11:42, the jury left the courtroom to					
17	continue deliberations.)					
18	(At 2:20 p.m., in the courtroom, jury					
19	not present.)					
20	THE COURT: We have a note from the jury which					
21	wants the testimony of the witness who testified as to the					
22	time and whereabouts of Vazquez at the time of his arrest.					
23	We will look for it.					

25

on cross-examination.

MR. SIFFERT: We have found Detective Berberich

1	jbesb24					
2	THE COURT: Whose testimony are we looking for?					
3	MR. SIFFERT: Mr. Berberich testified as to it.					
4	And then Detective Kilgallon exited his vehicle on the					
5	surveillance and participated in the arrest and that was					
6	gone into on Detective Kilgallon's direct examination.					
7	We were in the process of finding that.					
8	MR. TABACOFF: If I may be heard.					
9	THE COURT: See if you can help the					
10	stenographer.					
11	MR. TABACOFF: I wanted to say that they were					
12	going over testimony before, which is not what was					
13	requested.					
14	THE COURT: Let's let the reporter find the					
15	thing and then we will talk about what he has found.					
16	MR. TABACOFF: All I want the reporter to do is					
17	to look					
18	THE COURT: All I want the reporter to do is to					
19	get out the testimony of the arresting officers.					
20	MR. TABACOFF: I agree with you.					
21	(Pause)					
22	THE COURT: Bring in the jury.					
23	MR. TABACOFF: May I be heard.					
24	THE COURT: Yes, you will be heard.					

MR. TABACOFF: Before the jury is brought in.

2	I would like to know whose testimony is going to be read					
3	now.					
4	THE COURT: It will be your cross-examination					
5	of Mr. Berberich and a few questions on Kilgallon's					
6	statement.					
7	MR. TABACOFF: Thank you, your Honor.					
8	(At 2:35 p.m., the jury entered the					
9	courtroom.)					
10	THE COURT: On any notes that come out, I would					
11	wish it if the forelady would sign the name to the note so					
12	that I know that we have a note from the forelady.					
13	This note says that you would like the testimon					
14	of Vazquez's arresting officer or whichever detective					
15	testified as to the time and the whereabouts of Vazquez at					
16	the time of his arrest.					
17	Hopefully, we have found the place in the					
18	testimony that you are thinking about and the reporter will					
19	read it to you.					
20	This testimony has to do with, of course,					
21	April 28th, sometime between 4:15 and later that afternoon.					
22	(Record read)					
23	THE COURT: Is there anything else that the jury					
24	has in mind? That is the most that we have been able to					
25	distill from the testimony thus far.					
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jbesb-25

1	Jucob 20				
2	JUROR NO. 7: The time involved between the				
3	arrest of the other defendants and Vazquez.				
4	THE COURT: This all occurred between minutes,				
5	apparently.				
6	The testimony j t read by the reporter relates				
7	to the occurrences when the signal was given to arrest and				
8	when that signal was given, as you have heard the testimony.				
9	That is what occurred.				
10	JUROR NO. 7: Okay.				
11	THE COURT: Anything else?				
12	All right. You may retire.				
13	(At 2:40 p.m., the jury left the courtroom				
14	to continue deliberations.)				
15	THE COURT: Does anybody know whether the jury				
16	has had lunch?				
17	THE CLERK: It's been ordered.				
18	MR. TABACOFF: May I make a statement for the				
19	record, your Honor?				
20	THE COURT: Wait a minute. If you are going				
21	to do you object to anything that was stated?				
22	MR. TABACOFF: I object to what you stated, your				
23	Honor, most strongly.				
24	THE COURT: Bring the jury back here.				
25	MR. TABACOFF: I did not want to do it in fromt				

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of the jury.

THE COURT: That is the time for you to call things to my attention. None of this second-guessing business.

MR. TABACOFF: I am not second-guessing. I asked you what testimony. As far as I know, the question did not refer to anything of what Detective Balmer did or what. The question was just where and when and the place where the arrest was effected.

THE COURT: What are you objecting to, the fact that something was read or something that I said?

MR. TABACOFF: Two things, your Honor.

THE COURT: Bring the jury back. I will have you make your statement in the presence of the jury.

MR. TABACOFF: Thank you, your Honor.

(At 2:42 p.m., the jury entered the courtroom.)

THE COURT: Now, ladies and gentlemen, in making the statement in response to your question, I made a response to a juror's question.

I want you to ignore that response and to rely solely on the testimony that you hear. I have no intention to characterize the testimony. I don't want you to rely on any version of the testimony that you may think I gave you or on any statement in respect to the testimony that I gave

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jbesb-28 you. 2 I will have the testimony reread to you as it 3 appears on the record and I will make no comment and you are to be guided solely and only by what you hear from the 5 record and ignore anything that I may have said. 6 I have no intention at all of characterizing the testimony or to construe it or to deal with it in any other 8 way and that will serve to eliminate any conceivable 9 dispute that may exist in respect to anything that I said. 10 As I told you throughout this trial, this case 11 is to be decided on the basis of the evidence in the record 12 and the evidence alone and not on anything that a lawyer has 13 said or the Judge has said, unless you find that the 14 testimony accords with what was said. 15 Now, we will reread the record without any 16 comment whatsoever from anybody. 17 (Record read) 18 THE COURT: You may now retire. 19 (At 2:45 p.m., the jury left the courtroom 20 to resume deliberations.) 21 THE COURT: We will stand in recess. 22 (Recess) 23 (At 3:30 p.m., in the courtroom, jury 24

present.)

THE CLERK: Madam Forelady, have you reached a verdict?

THE FORELADY: Yes, we have.

THE CLERK: The jury's verdict is as follows:

You say that you find the defendant William Algarin guilty as charged.

You say further that you find the defendant

Jose Colon Rodriguez guilty as charged.

You also say that you find the defendant Pedro Vazquez not guilty.

So say you all.

THE COURT: Poll the jury.

THE CLERK: Members of the jury, listen to your verdict as it stands:

You say that you find the defendant William Algarin guilty as charged and that you find the defendant Jose Colon Rodriguez guilty as charged, and the defendant Pedro Vazquez not guilty.

(Each juror, upon being asked by the Clerk,
"Is that your verdict?", answered in the affirmative.)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, that

completes your service in this case. The Clerk advises me

that you are required to report downstairs to the Clerk, who

will give you further instructions as to any future jury

1	jbesb-30
2	service that you may be required to render.
3	Thank you very much for your attention to this
4	case.
5	You are now excused.
6	(Jury excused)
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	In the presence of the attorney for the detendant appeared in person of		MONTH	DAY YEAR
COUNSEL	WITHOUT COUNSEL IN	vever the court advised defendant of our commissed appointed by the court and the defe	it to no sel and asked whethe	er delendant pesired to a of counsel.
	WITH COUNSEL L	(Name	af course)	
PLEA	GUILTY, and the court being there is a factual basis for the		TENDERE, LA NOT	GUE TY
	. (LI NOT GUILTY. Defendant is di-	scharged	
	There being a Dandrog/verdict of	CI GUILTY. on court 5.		
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	The court wheat a bather in Contain in a			
SENTENCE OR	bereby committed to the costs of the Court III One CADER On COURT U.S., John Tenodal II.	anything to say why judgment should not be court adjudged the defendant guilty as of Attorney General or his authorized represent ust 5 purchases to 3ees on oil sembonde is suspend of TIRSE(3) VEASS, or oils County.	targed and convicted and ordered three Capturpus numbers of the Capturpus numbers of the Capturpus of the Ca	dithir The defendant
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The court asked whether defendant had anything to say why judgment should not be pronounced. Because no sufficient cause to the contri as shown, or appeared to the court, the court adjudged the defendant guilty as charged and convicted and ordered that. The defendant eachy committed to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized representative Cachington and Caching and AKSCC 33 3 ne. Tours sion of the longs is manacise. Last on a serior of the L(3) the project time order of this Corre. CONDITIONS

ADDITIONAL CO VENTIONS 0.6 FREBATION

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. 16 PROBATION CRUER

SPECIAL

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> In addition to the special conditions of probation imposed above, it is heighly ordered that the general conditions of probation set out on the towerse side of this judgment be imposed. The Court may change the conditions of probation, reduce or extend the period of probation, and any time riving the probation period or within a maximum probation period of five years permitted by law may issue a warrant and revok probation for a violation occurring during the probation period.

The court or fers commitment to the custody of the Altorney General and recommends,

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a certified copy of this indoment and assert ment to the U.S. Marship are all or many get officer.

s ordered that the Clark Jeliver

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ROBERT B. FISKE JR. NOV 1 8 1976

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